Hristo
Lagadinov from Uhrana 1943-1944 with
George Mladenov editor of
IMRO
Militia
And Volunteer Battalions
Of
1943-1944.
By Vic Nicholas
Table of Contents
Early Beginnings.....................
The Call to Arms.....................
Leadership, Structure and Motives.
Objectives and Ulterior Motives....
Violence and Bloodshed.............
German & ELAS Attacks...........
IMRO Volunteer Battalions.........
The Last Hoorah!............................
Photographic Appendix..............
Footnotes...............................
ARMY:
The IMRO Militia
And Volunteer Battalions
Of
1943.1944.
They came from mountain villages. They came from
the little hamlets on the plains. They came from the
small
provincial towns that stud the mountainous districts of
south
western
the pictures in their mind of the suffering of their
families and
their people under 30 years of Greek misrule and
occupation.
They were a collection of sturdy embittered
peasants
who were to become a fearsome fighting force and
who would
rule south western
district in particular with an iron fist. This
formation was
eventually to be extensively used quite
effectively in
conjunction with German forces during
anti-guerrilla sweeps
and drives. They were also used regularly as guard
troops. They
were to write in their own blood the final
glorious chapter in the
history of the IMRO.^ this local Macedonian
fighting force was
to be cruelly destroyed with the utmost brutality
and ultimately
suffer the final ignominy of being written out of
history.
This is their story. A story that encompasses
courage,
emancipation and finally defeat and suffering.
Early Beginnings
The Kostour (Kastoria) district was the epicenter of the
internecine warfare of the Macedonian struggle at
the turn of the
century. It was here, more than anywhere else,
that Greek mercenaries
committed grave atrocities on the local Macedonian
population! who
dared to organize themselves for a future devoid
of occupiers and a
future full of hope and freedom. Every village had
its share of heroes
and martyrs. The exploits of the local heroes such
as Vasil
Chakalaroff, Pando Kliasheff and Lazo
Pop-Traykoff3 were passed
-on
in village folk-lore and they
were revered in an almost saintly
manner by the local Macedonian population.
The violence perpetrated on the villages in this
district by the
Greek mercenaries after 1904,4 cemented into the
peasants collective
psychosis a distinct fe
towards Greeks. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 saw the
partition of
fanatically pro-Bulgarian districts of
south-western
illogical distribution of territory which bore no
correlation to the
ethnic back-ground and self determination of the
population living
there further exacerbated the already bad
situation. 6
During the 1920's and 30's, bad administration,
government
endorsed persecution and cruel mindless violence
by Greek
nationalist bands sowed the seeds of revenge that
kept brewing within
the local Macedonian population that was waiting
for an opportune
moment to forment.7 That opportunity would come in
the shape of
the second world war.
The Call to Arms - Rallying
Around the Committee Flag
It is generally accepted that the initial bands were
formed on
Italian occupation authorities who armed the local
Macedonian
villages to help combat the growing communist
threat presented by
the ELAS andartes8 raiding the Italian forces in
the district.9 A
company of 80 was established in the town of
March 5th under the command of Zhivko Shekrov and
Luka Dimanin
with Risto Naskov ably assisting. Within 3 days, a
further 34
volunteers from the
the militia's numbers.
More importantly, the ELAS forces in late 1942
launched a
series of attacks on the villages Drenichevo
(Kranahori), Starichani
(Lakomata), Zhelegozha (Pendavrison), Breshchani
(Avgi), Grache
(Ft
Macedonian population. The ELAS attacks and the
arming and
retaliatory measures taken by the local
Macedonians has gone down
m history as the Kostour (Kastoria) uprising, and
it's impact and
implications was to be far reaching. J_0
However, it has since come to light in a written
history of the
village Trsye/Lerin (Trivounon/Florina), that the
village was raided in
February 1943 by an armed IMRO detachment
dispatched from the
town of
were hiding in the village. The memoir further
states that the majority
of the boys of this detachment were natives of the
village of
Setoma/Kostour (Kefalaria/Kastoria). So there was
evidently some
clandestine arming of Macedonian peasants prior to
March 1943. The
Italian Military Command had also armed the
(
The colloquial name given to the bands armed in
March 1943
was 'Ohrana', a Russian loan word also being the
name of the czarist
secret police of
'guardian', and these roles were specifically what
the Italian
occupation authorities had in mind for this
fledgling force of armed
village militias.
The force comprised of men and boys from all the
peasant
occupations in the district. They were farmers,
farmers sons, share
croppers, orchardists, artisans, shephards, timber
cutters and itinerant
immigrant workers (sojoumers) who would ply their
trade in
stretches lasting up to seven years at a time
before returning to their
villages. L2 Their reasons for taking arms varied.
Some of the men
were pre-war members of IMRO, and thus harboured
deep patriotic
convictions. Others took arms for the sake of
tradition, in that they
wished to follow in the heroic foot steps of their
fathers and
grandfathers who forged a legendary reputation as
redoubtable
fighters against the Turks and Greeks during the
turn of the century
revolutionary struggle.
Most, however, took up arms to avenge wrong doings
and violence inflicted on their families by Greeks
and
Grecophiles and was motivated by the prospect of a
long
awaited opportunity to avenge the blood of their
kith and their
kin.
In fact, the men preferred to be known by the name
used
by their forebears — 'komiti' or 'komitadji' —
rather than 'Ohrana'
which was thrust upon them. Most of the villages
were armed to
company strength (usually between 25-30 men,
although larger
villages quite often had companies in excess of 50
men). The
companies were known by the colloquial name
of'chetas'. Their
enemies knew them by the name of'comitadjis'. The
majority of
the participants in this battle formation wore no
uniforms, just
their plain clothes. However, they wore a white
arm-band with
the word "Komiti" hand written in black
ink for the purpose of
identification.
Only the companies based in the towns of Kostour
(Kastoria) and Rupishcha (Argos Orestikon) wore
uniforms.
These were supplied by the Italians and were
resplendant with
shoulder patches bearing the inscription "Tiranska Cheta"
(Tyrants Company) and the letters IBK-SIS above
the
inscription which stood for "Italo-Bulgarski Komitet - Svoboda
Hi
Smrt" (Italo-Bulgarian
Committee " Freedom or Death) .15
Leadership, Structure and
Motives
Prior to the formation of the armed militias in
early
1943, the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces
in the
Balkans - Field Marshal List - consented in May
1941 to a
handful of officers from the Bulgarian army, which
was
occupying south eastern
to the German occupying forces as "liaison
officers". All the
Bulgarian officers brought into service were
locally born
Macedonians who had imigrated to
during the 1920's and 30's to avoid persecution.
All were
members ofIMRO and followers of Ivan
Mihailoff, the controversial, but dynamic leader of the
interwar
IMR0.
The main leaders and organizers during the early
phase of
activity from 1941 to 1942 were Tsvetan
MIadenoffFY and Andon
Kalcheff in the Lerin (Florina) region and Georgi
Sarakinoff in the
Voden (
Zhuzheltsi/Kostour (Spilea/Kastoria) in 1910 and
immigrated along
with his family to
dedicated to the ideals of a united and free
educated at the
Kalcheff studied in
All the liaison officers had their own little
headquarters which
were directly answerable to the army headquarters
in
attached to the German military kommandanturen (military commands)to
facilitate their connection with the local population and they also aided in
the activities of the Bulgarian club established in Salonika.Moreover, in
addition to the liaison officers in service at the German headquarters,
Bulgarian interpreters were also sent to assist in the towns of Kostour
(Kastoria), Voden (Edessa), Lerin (Florina), Kaylari(Ptolemaida) and the city
ofSolun (Salonika).
By 1943, the main local village company leaders in
the Kostour
(Kastoria) district were Pando Makrieff from the
village Chetirok
(
Paskal Kalemanoff "Dobrolitski" from
Dobrolishcha (Kalohorion),
Vasil
Lobanitsa (Agios Dimitrios), Mihail Ristovski and
Dinto Soulov from
Chereshnitsa (Polikerason), Boris Stoyanoff from
Gabresh (Gavros),
V
and Risto Naskoff - all from Ezerets
(Petropoulakion), Dimitar Ivanov
Mihailoff, the controversial, but dynamic leader of the
interwar
IMR0.
The main leaders and organizers during the early
phase of
activity from 1941 to 1942 were Tsvetan
MIadenoffFY and Andon
Kalcheff in the Lerin (Florina) region and Georgi
Sarakinoff in the
Voden (
Zhuzheltsi/Kostour (Spilea/Kastoria) in 1910 and
immigrated along
with his family to
dedicated to the ideals of a united and free
educated at the
Kalcheff studied in
aided in the activities of the Bulgarian club
established in
Moreover, in addition to the liaison officers in
service at the German
headquarters, Bulgarian interpreters were also
sent to assist in the towns of Kostour (Kastoria), Voden (
(Ptolemaida) and the city ofSolun (
(1) Chetiro (Mesopotamia), (2) Zagorichani (Vasilias),
(3) Blatsa(Oksya), (4) Tikveni (Kolokithou), (5) Starichani (Lakomata),
(6)Gorentsi (Korisos), (7) Dobrolishcha (Kalohorion), (8) Zhuzheltsi(Spilea)
(9) D'mbeni (Dhendrohori), (10) Kosinets (leropigi), (11)Drenichevo
(Kranohorion), (12) Gabresh (Gavros), (13) Bobishcha(Verga), (14) Kumanichevo
(Litya), (15) Churilovo (Agios Nikolaos),(16) Olishcha (M
(25) V'mbel (Moshohorion), (26) Lobanitsa (Agios
Dimitrios), (27)
Breshcheni (Avgi), (28) Zhelegozhe (Pendavrison), (29)
Chiflik (Ayia
Ana), (30) Ludovo (Kria Nera), (31) Ezerets
(Petropoulakion), (32)
Snicheni (Kastanofiton), (33) Semasi (Kremaston), (34)
Markoveni
(Ambelohorion), (35) Pesiak (Amudara), (36) Bela Crkva
(Asproklisya), (37) Shkrapari (Asproneron), (38) Mangila
(Ano
Perivolion), (39) Marchishcha (Kato Perivolion), (40)
Doleni
(Zevgostasion), (41) Setoma (Kefalarion), (42) Maniak
(Maniaki),
(43) Bapchor (Pimenikon)and other villages with smaller
companies.22 In the Kostour (Kastoria) and Lerin (Florina) counties there were 1,600
men under arms. Over 1,000 of these men were in the Kostour area alone,
including the sizeable companies based in the town of Kostour (Kastoria) with
some 200 men under the command of Lazar Mladenoff and 180 men in the town of Rupishcha
(Argos Orestikon) led by Paskal Kalemanoff, with a
further 130 men under the leadership of Dimitar Ivanov
based at the
The Italian officers who were in command of the
Italian force
for the whole Kostour (Kastoria) district and as a
result also the
nominal commanders of this early security
formation were Division
Commander A. Venieri and his assistant officer
known by the name
'Ravalli'.24 The headquarters for the IMRO
committee was set-up in
Kostour (Kastoria) itself, from which Kalcheff and
his supporters
would visit all the villagers in the district.
Not only did they manage to arm the greater
majority of
villages in the county in which Macedonians lived.
They even
managed to arm some villages from the Lerin
(Florina) district which
border the Kostour (Kastoria) district as well.
Some of the Lerin
(Florina) villages armed in 1943 were: Trsye
(Trivounon), Turye
(Korifi), Nered (Polipotamos), Lagen
(Triandafilya), Prekopana
(Perikopi), Banitsa (Vevi), Srebreno (Asproyia),
German (Agios
Germanos) and others. The
addition to the large militia company numbering in
excess of 70 men,
was also used as an outlying base for an Italian
garrison and
Carbiniera (police).25Kalcheff s success in arming
villages was based on appealing to simple concepts that the average Macedonian
peasant could readily identify with. Kalcheff and his followers were able to
easily exploit the deep rooted anti-Greek sentiment that was brewing within the
vast majority of Macedonian peasants. However, in order to convince the peasants
to take up arms as part of the greater Axis cause required some shrewd
propaganda. Captain Patrick Evans, a British Liaison Officer of the Special
Operations Executive parachuted into south western Macedonia in 16 September
1943, describes in his top secret report Kalcheffs modis operand!, citing a
deposition given by a
woman captured by the ELAS andartes in an attack
on Prekopana
(Perikopi).
The Slav-Macedonians fear and distrust
though they have usually shown them friendly to
British
officers and or's in the mountains during the
occupation, once the
British had shown themselves forthcoming and not
standoffish.
The reason for this distrust is that in the
Macedonian peasant's
mind
Metaxas, who made the Slav language illegal in
people on castor oil for speaking it. During the
occupation Bulgar
propaganda was quick to exploit this angle of the
situation. 'Kaltchef
and some others came to our village from Kastoria and they
gathered all the people together and told us "The
Andartes are with
the British and the British will bring back the King and
an old
[i.e. the Greece of Metaxas]. Therefore you must take
arms against
the Andartes".
Another action that was successful in gaining and
winning the
peasants trust was the initiative of Kalcheff and
other committee
members for the negotiated release of Macedonian
prisoners of war
held by the Italians and Germans, and also the
Macedonian political
prisoners held by the Greek authorities in the
prisons and internment
camps situated on the islands of Makronisos,
others.This move was an apparent public relations
success and
opened doors to villages and individuals which
hitherto viewed the
'Ohrana' operatives in great skepticism and as
agents of the Gestapo.
Some of the released men promptly volunteered
their services to the
IMRO committee office in Kostour (Kastoria),
offering their services
as Italian and German interpreters and liaison
personnel, many of
them having gained a working knowledge of the
languages in their
period of incarceration.
The men recruited to the 'Ohrana' village bands
were not
lacking in soldierly qualities by any means. Most
of them had served
as conscripts in the Greek army, which
successfully pushed back the
Italian invasion force in 1940 and fought
heroically in the sub-zero
temperatures of the Albanian mountains. They
surpassed all other
units with their durability and their ability to
withstand extreme cold.
However, more importantly, in terms of pedigree,
their fathers and
grandfathers invented hit and run, and defensive,
set-piece guerilla
warfare forty years earlier. They were guerilla
fighters9 par excel
lance, and did not need to be taught how to ambush
and disable a
larger fighting force.
Objectives and Ulterior
Motives
The 'Ohrana' bands were originally formed by the
Italians
with the intention of serving as 'anti-Andartes'
squads and also with
the ulterior motive of dividing the population as
part of the "divide
and rule" philosophy employed by occupiers
since the dawn of time.
However, due to the IMRO involvement both locally
and externally,
the ideology and objectives of the bands were
formulated by their
own commanders and NCO's with only minor
consultation with the
Italian liaison officers. Therefore, the bands,
far from merely being
collaborationist formations, set their own agenda
based on their own
goals and the whole movement took on a life form
all of its own.
The principal Italian objective was to divide the
population,
deprive the communist ELAS fighters access to
villages and a steady
food supply and create a protective ring around
the main roads that
linked the key towns, such as the Kostour
(Kastoria) - Sorovich
(Amindeon) road and other important thoroughfares
that required
guarding from ELAS attacks on supply columns.
The agenda of the bands, however, was to curtail
the arrogant
and lawless behaviour of their own brethren who
had become
Grecophiles — the notorious 'Grkomani'. To flush
out spies (shpioni)
and neut
especially the Pontian refugee sub-group.30 All
efforts possible were
to be made to prevent the forcible recruiting of
young Macedonian
peasants by the ELAS 9th and 10th Divisions based
in western
Greek nationalist bands also operating in the
area. Most importantly,
the bands main objective was simply to guard and
protect their
villages, hearths and kin from Greek excesses. In
a general context, to
facilitate the re-incorporation of Greek occupied
a re-formed and united
future and to put to an end the reign of Greek
terror.
IMRO's involvement in 'Ohrana' in 1943 was of a more or
less
indirect nature - chiefly through Ivan Mihailov's
support for Ante
Pav
through the Macedonian Popular Bank. Mihailov was not
accepted
in
the independent Croatian state convinced Mihailoff that
he could
represent the interests of IMRO and the Macedonian
population of
south western
In early 1943, Pav
and his Foreign Minister and son-in-law Count
Galeazzo Ciano.
Pav
had failed in persuading the Italian army to arm
the Macedonian
population in order for it to defend itself from
the raids of the Greek
Andartes and Albanian nationalists. According to a source
from the
old pre-communist Bulgarian National Security
Service, the change in
attitude of the Italian occupation authorities
towards the Macedonian
population was due to the decisive intervention of
Ivan Mihailov
through Ante Pav
Prior to this intervention, the Italian
occupational authorities
in south-western
formations and quisling administration as well as
the Albanian
nationalist bands.
respected standing with the Italians and the
Germans was the deciding
factor in favor of the Macedonians, coupled with
the fact that the
Italians wished to neut
thus have one less enemy.
In the beginning of April 1943, on the initiative
of the
leadership of the IMRO, a delegation of the
Kostour Brotherhood in
president of the brotherhood Spiro Vasilev and the
members Georgi
Kis
Trifonoff. Upon their return to
a comprehensive report to King Boris detailing
their mission. In the
report they described the terrible and unhappy lot
of the Macedonian
peasant population as well as the creation of the
Macedonian-
Bulgarian action committees and the militia
formations and their
armed resistance to the ELAS andartes terror. The
delegation
requested 1000 rifles, 20 light and heavy machine
guns and the
necessary quantity of munitions so that all
volunteers be armed. The
report also pointed to the high combat spirit of
the people and the
militiamen and insisted that
to the insurgents.
Violence and Bloodshed
The formation of the Ohrana' bands and the growing
confidence of the local Macedonian population
enraged the minority
Turkish refugee Greeks and the Grecophiles, who up
to this time held
sway over the population with acts of violence and
threats of
persecution. Now, with the 'Ohrana in firm control
in all the districts
of the county, the threats from the refugee Greeks
and the
Grecophiles was reduced to impotence and even
ridicule.
Many leading refugee Greeks and Grecophile
Fanatics who
had persecuted Macedonians in the pre-war Metaxas
junta years and
even earlier, were rounded up and jailed in
Kostour (Kastoria) and
Rupishcha (
agitators were also jailed. These punitive actions
on certain occasions
led to violent retribution against particularly
notorious prisoners held
by the militiamen as noted by Evans:
An incident which sheds some light on the
Macedonian
problem in
gentleman called Karageorgiou was living in Argos
Orestikon; he was
the head of a much respected family in that
district, and in the old
days under the Turks had been Chairman of the
'Greek Committee'
which provided a focus for local Greek unity
against both Turks and
comitadjis. In 1943 old Mr Karageorgiou was thrown
into prison in
terrorizing the Greeks. A young comitadji entered
his cell, began to
beat him and ended by killing him, some say by
smashing his head
against a wall, others by bashing it in with the
heel of his boot. 33
While the militiamen were definitely forceful in
their
methods and on certain occasions over stepped the
boundaries, they
were still - by and large - remarkably humane by
the standards of
those violent years and in direct comparison to
their adverseries.
In early April, a battle formation consisting of 300
Ohrana bandsmen
and an Italian force of two battalions, attacked the
ELAS positions at
the villages of Nestram (Nestorion), Stensko (Stena), Chuka
(Arh
What followed was a heavy four day battle
where the ELAS guerrillas were forced to retreat to
Langa in the far
south of the county and regroup after being shaken at
the ferocity of
the combined Italian/Ohrana offensive. It was now only a
matter of
time before ELAS would strike back in order to restore
lost
credibility. It was not a question of "if, but,
"when" and "where".
life for the peasants of the (Kostour) Kastoria
district, when news
filtered through that ELAS had attacked the
village of
Zhelegozhe/Kostour (Pendavrison/Kastoria), which
was an Ohrana
stronghold, and burned all the Macedonian homes.
An old
Macedonian woman known as "baba Zoya"
was killed by the ELAS
marauders when she was burnt to death during this
raid.
On
attack on the
ELAS was determined to sow the seeds of fear into
the Macedonian
peasant population in the district who were
actively participating in
Ohrana, by making a brutal example of the
Macedonian militiamen of
Starichani. 600 ELAS Andartes attacked the village
and rounded up
40 men — including the priest — and executed them
all on the spot
without provocation or trial. The village was then
pillaged and
burned.
The massacre at Starichani was the single largest
atrocity
committed by Greeks on local Macedonians since the
famous
massacre
perpetrated by the
Greek mercenaries at
Zagorichani/Kostour (Vasilias/Kastoria) on
the Greek andartes massacred (according to the
memoirs ofMa
leader of the Greek participants) 150 men, woman
and children. 3 7
If the object of the massacre at Starichani was to
frighten the
Macedonians into non-participation in the Ohrana
bands, in actuality,
it hastened the speed of recruitment and
considerably swelled the
ranks of the Ohrana. The peasants felt a great
need to be armed to
avoid the fate of Starichani. The massacres also
heavily underlined
the propaganda of Kalcheff and his followers by
bringing to life the
very fears they were propagating. ELAS's brutal
actions drove many
villages into the arms of the axis forces to save
themselves from
further horrors.
These callous attacks cemented in the local
Macedonian
populaces mind negative images ofELAS. Despite
ELAS containing
a sprinkling of Macedonians in its ranks and
espousing a left wing
ideology of creating a new world order, ELAS in
it's treatment of
Macedonians, was - in effect - not much better
than the Quisling
Greek government and its armed supporters. It was
commonly
perceived by Macedonians that all the Grecophiles
and spies had
joined ELAS, and as a direct result - most
Macedonians felt bitterness
or distrust towards the ELAS formations.38 Captain
Patrick Evans
noted that:
"..... It was unprofitable anyway,
except in villages permenantly
garrisoned by Andartes to
display Greek sympathies
The ELAS attacks continued. On
launched a series of attacks on the villages of
Trsye (Trivounon),
Nestram (Nestorion) and Ezerets (Petropoulakion)
and forcefully
abducted Macedonian youths. During the attack on
Ezerets alone, 13
people were abducted. Local Macedonian youths were
abducted
during the raids on the villages Zhupanishcha (Ano
Levki), Nestram
(Nestorion), Chetirok (
Sveta Nedela (Ayia Kyriaki) and others.
During the attack on Kumanichevo (Litya) in the
Kostour
(Kastoria) region, the militiamen succeeded in
repelling the
numerically superior ELAS andartes formation in a
heroic defensive
action. Also, the Macedonian militiamen in
Zagorichani (Vasilias),
B'mboki (Stavropotamos) and other villages also in
the Kostour
region refused point blank to surrender their
weapons and also
repulsed the ELAS andartes. It was not just the
communist ELAS
which was thrown into action against the Ohrana
militiamen at this
time, but also the nationalist formations of
Colonel Poulos, the so
called "Poulos
Verband" based in Kailar (Ptolamaida) and the
infamous Greek nationalist organizations PAO and
EKKA who
commenced a reign of terror over the Macedonian
village
population.4j_ Due to the cruelties of the ELAS
Andartes squads and
the other nationalist Greek armed formations over
the local
Macedonian population, the situation continued
worsening.
According to a report from the
May 1943 the Italian military authorities
continued their
passive approach towards the ELAS Andartes and
nationalist Greek
bands who were behaving aggressively. They
continued attacking the
Macedonian villages, plundering and setting them
on fire, as well as
murdering prominent local Macedonian activists and
the relatives of
the militiamen. The district governor pleaded for
more effective
protection of the local population as well as the
supplying of
foodstuffs in order to r
population.
In
a different report it was
indicated that Venieri was
d
was further worsening the situation of the
Macedonian population.
Instead of assisting the militiamen fight against
the ELAS andartes,
the Italians defied all logic by attacking the
villages of Grache
(Ftelya), Drenichevo (Kranohorion), Zhelegozhe
(Pendavrison) and
Nestram (Nestorion) with artillery inflicting
severe damage. After
reporting information of this attack to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the commander of the Fifth Army and the Army
Headquarters
insisted that ministry intervene in
destroying Macedonian villages.
While reporting on the difficult situation of the
Macedonians
in Kostour (Kastoria) region, Colonel Ivan Marinov
requested that the
Bulgarian army be allowed to occupy the Kostour
region in
accordance with the German and Italian commands.
Marinov also
personally oversaw the hand over of a supply of
960 rifles and 3
machine-guns with the necessary munitions to the
Macedono-
Bulgarian Committee in Kostour (Kastoria). Spiro
Vasilev and the
remaining members of the delegation assisted in
the organization and
strengthening of the village companies. The
delegation also assisted
in the appointment ofNCO's, the organization of a
police service and
the order of command at the HQ in Kostour
(Kastoria). In a report
titled "Kostoursko Denes" (Kastoria
Today) from
Spiro Vasilev stated that the Italian military
authorities were not
fulfilling the obligations as was originally agreed with
the Central
Macedonian Committee in Kostour. Italy’s Capitulation and the Mission of Ivan Mihailov
In
taking place which were to shape the course of the
war and especially
the military-political situation in the Balkans.
Mussolini was brought
down from power on July 26th, and the government
of Marshal
Badaglio was created, which was to effectively
take
war.
The subsequent military capitulation of
September 1943 which signed an armistice with the
allies that
required all Italian forces to lay down their
arms, immediately created
acute logistical problems for the Germans and a
nightmarish situation
for the Macedonians. The German occupation
authorities were
suddenly confronted with the specter of having to
garrison large
sections of the Greek mainland. To do this
properly, the German
authorities would more than ever require the
support of anti-
communists, ethnic minorities and other
disaffected groups to assist
with the policing and garrison duties.
The immediate and pressing problem facing the
Macedonians
was the loss of the Italians as a benefactor and
the back-up security
this provided. A de facto cease fire came into
affect. Also, prior to the
Italian capitulation, the "Shar" student
corporation initiated the
concept of the creation of IMRO volunteer corps in
order to aid the
population of south-western
initiative, Ivan Mihailov and his cohorts from the
Central Committee
of IMRO decided without the authority or knowledge
of the
Bulgarian government to commence direct
negotiations with the
Wehrmacht.45 It was apparent that Mihailov and his
associates had
broader plans than the initial student initiative.
Mihailov formulated
plans which envisaged that the volunteer corps
would not only protect
the populace from the ELAS Andartes raids, Greek
nationalist bands
and Greek administration in south western
spear-head moves for the creation of an spear-head moves
for the
creation of an Independent Macedonia under a German
aegis. It was
also anticipated that the IMRO volunteers would form the
core of the
armed forces of a future Independent Macedonia in
addition to
providing administration and education in the Lerin
(Florina),
Kostour (Kastoria) and Voden (
control.
Around 1st August 1943, Ivan Mihailov
left
for
and the headquarters of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Police)
where he spoke to Hitler and Himmler and other top
German leaders.
From the scant available German information, it is
apparent that
Mihailov received consent to create two to three
battalions consisting
of volunteers armed with German weapons and
munitions. Moreover,
these battalions were to be under the operative
command and disposal
of Reichsfuhrer-SS
Himmler. Additionally, in
between high-ranking functionaries of the SS and
the IMRO Central
Committee members V. Kurtev, G. Nastev and D.
Tsilev who
maintained extensive links with the Germans.
After reaching an agreement with Mihailov in
Himmlers HQ undertook concrete steps for the
formation of the
IMRO companies. This could be evidenced by a
letter of the German
minister plenipotentiary in
Wilhelmstrasse. In it he informs that the Hauptbahnfuhrer of the SS,
Heider had established contact with the military
attache of the Reich
in the embassy. In his conversations with him, he
clarified that he is
commissioned from the SS HQ in
volunteer squads from IMRO supporters from
local volunteers, who after being clothed and
armed would be sent to
fight the ELAS guerrillas in south western
Macedonia.48
During the same period as his mission, the SS
representative
also consulted with the representative of the
German intelligence in
of the tasks given to him and the necessity for
close contacts with
Neubacher in
negotiations between Mihailov and the SD, the
Bulgarian government
obtained certain information about them via the
Bulgarian legation in
1943 its agent "T" sent a confidential report
to the chief of the
Intelligence Department at the Army headquarters,
Colonel S.
Kutsarov. In it we read:
"About
a month ago (November 1943) the German command has
commissioned
the IMRO - Ivan Mihailov, who recently lives in
squads.
In regard to the organizing of the volunteer
companies of
IMRO, under the orders of the Central Committee,
Reserve
Lieutenant Georgi Dimchev set off for
September 1943. Dimchev was one of the leaders at
that time of the
Macedonian Youth
Dimchev met with Ivan Mihailov who explained to
him the nature of
the tasks of the volunteer companies and provided
Dimchev with a
plan of their organization and command.
German and ELAS Attacks
In early March 1944, the Germans taking up where
the
Italians left off, reformed, re-organized and
re-armed the village
companies in the Kostour (Kastoria) district. Soon
after the villages in
the Voden (
prepared for service. All the villages in the
Kostour district who had
participated with such distinction the year before
were again ready for
service. The exception being the villages of
D'mbeni (Dendrohori),
Drenichevo (Kranohorion) and a few others who had
been seduced by
communist propaganda and had defected to ELAS
ranks and the
newly formed S.N.O.F. brigade.
By May 1944 bases of company strength spmng up
around
the country side and the area around Kostour
(Kastoria), the local
lake, and the vital
expansion and re-arming of the militia extended
into Lerin and Voden
by Kalchev's loyal cadres. The participating
villages that were armed and mobilized in the Lerin (Florina) district
included:
Sorovich (Amindeon), Vrbeni (Itea), Banitsa (Vevi),
Popozheni
(Papayianni), Voshtareni (M
(Kato Idrusa), Lagen (Triandafilea), Armensko (A'lona),
Neret
(Polipotamos), Oshchima (Trigonon), Germanos (Aghios ),
Sekulevo
(
(Korifi), Prekopana (Perikop), Aytos (Aetos), Ekshi Su
(Xino Nero),
Zeienich (Sklitron), Brezhnitsa (Vatohori), Orovo
(Piko).
And many others including the town of
also had its own sizeable company.53^ The active
villages in the
Voden (
(Mesimerion), Pod (Flamurya), Orizari (Rizarion),
Yavoryeni
(Platani), Vladovo (Agras), Gugovo (Vrita), Teovo
(Karidya),
V'lkoyanovo (Liki), Nisiya (Nision), Slatina
(Hrisi), Ostrovo
(Amisa), Oshlyani (Agia Fotini), Margarita and
many others.
Moreover, companies were also organized in the
sub-prefectures of
Kailyari (Ptolamais), Enidje Vardar (Yianitsa) and
Gumendzhe
(Goumenissa).
Meanwhile, ELAS was on the rampage attacking
villages
across
March 1944 the village ofVeschitsa (Angelohorion)
was raided and a
villager Georgi Krechkov was executed. On the same
day, the
brothers
Kozov from the
(Lukovitsa/Veria) were summarily executed. On the
16th of March
ELAS raided
the
Petros/Goumenissa) where they rounded up and
executed 9 villagers.
Also, on the same day a further 6 villagers were
executed in the
ELAS raid on the village ofTresino/S'botsko (Orma/Aridea).55
On
was raided and a villager Georgi Krechkov was
executed. On the
same day, the brothers Kozov from the
(Lukovitsa/Veria) were summarily executed. On the
16th of March
ELAS raided
the
Petros/Goumenissa) where they rounded up and
executed 9 villagers.
Also, on the same day a further 6 villagers were
executed in
the ELAS raid on the
On
Tikveni/Kostour (Kolokinthou/Kastoria) destroying
the bridge and
burning most of the village to the ground.
The Militiamen from the Kostour and Voden
districts were
actively involved in the German anti-guerrilla
sweep "Operation May
Thunderstorm" which was launched on
south of Voden (
this operation amounted to around 600 men from the
4th SS Division
in the form of the Battle Group "Lange". They were ably
supported
by several IMRO volunteer companies from the
Kostour (Kastoria)
and Voden (
In the beginning of May 1944 the Waffen-SS company
that
had been in the Kostour (Kastoria) area was
unexpectedly withdrawn.
This move was a "Green light" for the
local guerrilla regiment of the
9th ELAS Partisan Division to launch a series of
attacks aimed at
taking control of not only the towns and hamlets
in the region, but the
vitally important Klissura Pass as well. The large
company numbering 200 men that was based in the town of
Soon the
recaptured. A volunteer company of the Kostour
militia, formed from
volunteers from the hamlet of Zagorichani
(Vassiliada) and the
to advance on Kostour (Kastoria), entering the town
on May 29th
1944. The company had begun receiving rifle and
machine-gun fire
when it reached the Rupishcha (Argos Orestikon)
area, but quickly
pushed ahead and attacked the town head on. The
attack was so quick
and fast, that the headquarters' company of the
ELAS unit which had
made its residence in the town was captured by the
militiamen. This major success was offset two days later, when
the"Vermio" Detachment (belonging to the ELAS 9th Partisan
Division)
attacked a force that had been organized by Major
Andon Kalchev at
the village ofYavoryeni (Platani), near Voden (
the IMRO militiamen during the fierce, three hour
battle. ELAS
accounts boasted that their losses only included 5
dead and 30
wounded. It was a disaster that would not be
forgotten - but in the
months ahead, worse was to follow.
IMRO Volunteer Battalions
In addition to the village companies in these
counties, there
was also formed three volunteer battalions. These
were organized by
the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(IMRO) and
were to carry the name "IMRO Volunteer Battalions".
They were
formed after the arrival of the IMRO cadres from
the Sofia IMRO HQ
who arrived initially in Voden. The IMRO cadres
who set off for
Voden were Ivan Motikarov, Ivan Ilchev, Atanas
Pashkov, Dobri
Boumbalov, Metodi Kerpachev, Stefan Bochvarov,
Georgi Begimov,
Konstatin Popov and others.
Prior to their arrival, they had met up with
Georgi Dimchev
and Dimitar Tsilev both officers of Macedonian
origin in the
Bulgarian Army stationed in
Voden (
and army officers met up with the German Kommandant, Major
Heider of the Waffen SS with whom they discussed
the formation of
the volunteer corps. This was in accordance with
the agreement
Ivan Mihailov and IMRO struck with Hitler and Himmler
for the
formation and arming of volunteer companies and
battalions.
The first formed was the Kostour (Kastoria)
Battalion which
was designated as the 1st IMRO
Volunteer Battalion - "Kostour", but,
commonly referred to as the "Kostoursko
Battalion" (Kastoria
Battalion). The key figure in the organization of
the Kostour Battalion
was Captain Ivan Motikarov who was ably assisted
by Hristo
Lagadinov. Together with 30 volunteers, they set
off for the town of
Kostour and proceeded to form the volunteer corps
from the
enthusiastic volunteers. The Kostour Battalion consisted of 500
volunteers who were drawn from the surrounding
communities who
were to assist the local village companies in
defending themselves.64
The IMRO Volunteers in Kostour wore Italian Army
uniforms with arm bands that were Red and Black
with the
inscription: "Volunteer Battalion
Kostour" in yellow lettering. The
Reserve Company of the Battalion was located in
Kostour itself and
was supplied with machine-guns and even mortars.65
One
"Marksman" Company from the Kostour
Battalion was detached in
the summer of 1944 and assigned to a reinforced
company of the 4th
SS Police Armored Infantry Division which was
making a sweep of
the area. The move was an apparent success for
everywhere that the
Waffen-SS company and the "Kostour"
volunteer company went was
soon cleared of ELAS guerrillas. The civilian
population was so
afraid of this battle group that their very
presence in an area was
enough to quiet any civilian protest.
The second to form was the 3rd IMRO
Volunteer Battalion -
"Voden", which was also referred to by
it's town of origin -
"Vodensko Battalion" (
responsible for the formation and leadership of
this Battalion were
Georgi Dimchev and Atanas Pashkov. Dimchev was a
local hero,
having been born in the
(Atira/Yiannitsa) and his assistant Pashkov and
other volunteers were
most successful in gathering volunteers not only
from Voden
(
(Yianitsa) and Gumendzhe (Goumenissa). They
assembled a force of
800 enthusiastic men who were armed and ready for
service for the
fatherland. The Voden Battalion wore re-cut Italian uniforms consisting of
trousers, jacket with straps and the hat which featured prominantly the symbol
of the Macedonian revolutionaries - the skull and cross bones. Above that a red
with black cross. On the sleave there was a shoulder patch with the Latin
intials B.D.V. - signifying "Bulgaro-Macedonian Volunteers - Voden".
There were also plans to form a seperate Volunteer
Battalion
in the town ofEnidzhe
Kostour, Lerin and Voden Battalions, but the
German high-command
refused permission for its formation.69 The last
to form was the lind
IMRO Volunteer Battalion - "Lerin",
which needless to say, much
like its counterparts in Kostour and Voden was
referred to simply as
the "Lerinsko Battalion" (Florina
Battalion). By
1st "Kostour" and 3rd
"Voden" Battalions were already in active
service, while the 2nd
"Lerin" Battalion was still in the process of
being organized and trained. 70
It was envisaged that these battalions would form
the
vanguard of the whole Macedonian military effort
in Western
ELAS guerrilla forces. They were considered an
much the same manner as the German SS. The Kostour
(Kastoria)
Battalion was to gain a fearsome reputation in the
sweeps and drives
it participated in and for courage under fire -
and was considered the
most prestigious of the three battalions.
Regular rotation of these volunteers to different
bases and
regions, plus the regular pay and allowances like
German forces
received was a great aid in keeping the morale of
these volunteers up
and in no case was any of these volunteer bases
ever successfully
attacked by the Communist guerrilla bands.71
The Last Hoorah!
After ELAS had failed to succeed in its attempts
to discredit
the volunteer IMRO militia bands in the eyes of
the local population,
the anti-fascist bands of EAM and ELAS instigated
a drastic program
of systematic violence in the villages against
relatives of the
volunteers. They were arrested, beaten and shot in
public, and their
houses were plundered and burned. In order to I
prevent the further recruitment of new volunteers by the
IMRO
militias or battalions, ELAS forcibly mobilized all the
Macedonian
peasants of fighting age into its Greek units. In one
report of Colonel
Mirchev to the staff of the army from
that the ELAS Andartes took captive the band led by
Kosta
Kachaunov near the
militiamen. In order to frighten the local population,
the ELAS
andartes then proceeded to slaughter all the militiamen
in cold blood.
On
Company / 4th Waffen-SS Police
detachment pounced on the village
of D'mbeni (Dhendrohori) in the Kostour (Kastoria)
district to assail
two ELAS units which were stationed there. D'mbeni
was a large
Macedonian village which had become a centre of
communist activity
in the mountainous forests in the north-western
region of the Kostour
district. The attacking battle group consisted of
80 IMRO
Battalionists and 50 heavily armed German storm
troopers kitted out
in their distinctive camouflage uniforms. They
were led by three
Macedonian NCOs and one German officer.
The battle group stealthily surrounded the village
at dawn and
prepared to close in on the ELAS units by taking
up key strategic
positions prior to the engagement. One of the ELAS
units was hiding
in the village school-house, while the other ELAS
unit was billeted in
various houses in the village. When the ELAS
guerillas realised that
they were surrounded, they began firing and they
attempted to
withdraw from the village. A heavy engagement
ensued that lasted an
hour. Nine ELAS guerillas were killed as were
three Germans. One
German was heavily wounded. The collateral damage
consisted of
one civilian killed and three wounded in the
cross-fire. Also, one
house and fifteen barns were set ablaze. The ELAS
units managed to
escape the encirclement during the engagement. On
Division. The operation lasted two weeks until the
17th July. The
German forces numbered some 12-15,000 men, which
included
elements of the 4th SS Division, 639th
Security Regiment and the 104th eJdger
Division. The participating Macedonian
formations included the 1st IMRO Volunteer
Battalion
"Kostour" from Kastoria and the 2nd
IMRO Volunteer Battalion
"Lerin" from Florina. Also, taking part were
the 3rd Police
Volunteer Battalion from Verria which was made up of
Italians
and even some German raised Albanian Balisti. In
addition to
these forces were also three security battalions from
Kozani.
Accounts from ELAS sources admit to the ferocity of this
offensive, admitting that on account of this Axis
attack, their
forces became seperated and cut off.
On 21st of August 1944 ELAS
successfully attacked the
IMRO stronghold at the village of Chereshnitsa /
Kostour
(Polikerason / Kastoria). During the battle, 20
IMRO militiamen
were reported killed in action and 300 militiamen
were
captured. The ELAS commander gave orders that the
captured
prisoners not be shot, but must be killed with the
knife. This
order was carried out. ELAS accounts also boast of
capturing 4
machine-guns and 150 automatic rifles. On
begin a withdrawal from Kostour (Kastoria). The
was already in guerrilla hands, so the withdrawal
had to be
made under enemy fire.
In
September, two IMRO companies were wiped out in
the heroic defense of Voden (
and 10th Partisan Division attack.
Photographic Appendix
ABOVE: Vanco Mihailov
BELOW: Spiro Kitincev
FOOTNOTES:
1_. IMRO stands for the Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary
Organisation, which was originally formed in
group of Macedonian intellectuals with a Bulgarian
national outlook.
The aim of the IMRO was to weld the villages of
conscious nation and the autonomy of
information on the the formation of IMRO, see "The
Politics of
Terror" by Duncan Perry (1988)
2. It must be point out that at this stage of Macedonian
history, most
Macedonians felt themselves Bulgarian, or at the very
least, pro-
Bulgarian. Macedonians stand to Bulgarians as Austrians
stand to
Germans; the differences, especially at that time, are
slight. While the
leadership was strongly Bulgarophile, within the ranks
of the IMRO
companies and Battalions the picture varied with men who
felt simply
Bulgarian, others who felt themselves Macedonian, but
with strong
pro-Bulgarian sympathies, and some who felt simply
Macedonian and
who did not care where national salvation was coming
from. The
common thread that united them was an undying enmity
toward
Greeks.
3. Chakalaroff and Kliasheff were from the
(Kristalopigi),
while Pop-Traykoff hailed
from D'mbeni
(Dhendrohori). All from the Kostour (Kastoria) district.
4. See "The Greek Struggle in
Dakin (
massacres perpertrated by Greek merceneries during this
period.
5. See "Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood" by AnastasiaN.
Karakasidou
(
Nationalism in a Transnational World" by Loring M.
Danforth (New
formation of ethnic identities.
6.
received 38% and
barbaric behavior of the Greek army in the Balkan
campaign of
1912-13, see: "Carnegie Endowment For International
Peace:
Report of the International Commission To Inquire into
the
Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars" (
1914) and the article "The Devastation of
Macedonia" by H.M.
Wallis. "Quarterly Review" Vol. 220 (London
Jan-Apr 1914)
7. See
"London Times"
massacre of innocent civilians at the villages of Triis,
Karakoy
and Lovech (all in the Seres district). For examples of
flagrant
government endorsed human rights abuses particularly
against
ethnic Macedonians during the Metaxas dictatorship, see:
"Exiles in the
(pp 387-389) by Aust
8. 'ELAS' is an acronym for Elinikos Laikos
Apolettherotikos
Stratos (Greek Popular Liberation Army). 'Andartes' is
the
Greek name for guerrilla fighters.
9. See: "Egeyski Buri: Revolutsionemoto Dvizhenye
Vo
Vodensko i NOF Vo Egeyska Makedonia" (pp 104 &
123) by
V
10. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadno
Makedonia (1941-44)" article by Dr Dobrin Michev in
"Makedonski Pregled" (page 77) Volume XX, 1997, No 4.
(
Central Bulgarian Archives in Tmovo. File 23/1/792/4-5.
1_L See: "Kratka Istoricheska Biografia Na Rodnoto
Mi Selo
Trsye" (pp 126-129) by Traian Andonoff Giorgioff (
1994) and "Uchasta Na Balgarite v Egeyska Makedonia
1936-
46 - Politecheska i Voena Istoria" (page 411) by
Georgi
Daskalov (Sofia 1999) regarding the arming of the
village of
Chetirok (Mesapotamia).
12. For in depth details on the occupations of
Macedonian work
immigrants see: "Sojoumers and Settlers: The
Macedonian
Community in
1995) and "The Macedonians in
1989)
13. Greek historian John Koliopoulos (1994) suggests
that the
collaboration of the peasants with the Germans, Italians
and the
Bulgarians was determined by the geopolitical position
of each
village. Depending upon whether their village was
vulnerable to
attack by the Greek communist guerrillas (ELAS) or the
occupation forces, the peasants would opt to support the
side in
relation to which they were most vulnerable. When the
Greek
communists created the SNOF, many of the former
collaborators enlisted in the new unit. In both cases, the
attempt
was to promise "freedom" (autonomy or
independence) to the
formerly persecuted Slavic minority as a means of
gaining its
support. This argument is slightly flawed for a couple
of
reasons. Those Macedonian villages (a small minority)
that did
join ELAS instead of the 'Ohrana' village companies, did
so
because they contained prominent co-villagers who had
been
pre-war members of the KKE (Greek Communist Party). The
villages of Zhupanishcha (Ano Levki) and Orman (Kato
Levki)
by the power of Koliopoulos's reasoning, should have
come
under the influence of the IMRO village companies and
Battalions due to the fact that their geopoltical
positioning was
in the middle of a thoroughly 'OhranaVIMRO Battalion
sub-
district. Despite having the staunchly IMRO villages of
Maniak
(Maniaki), Izglibe (Porya), Tikveni (Kolikinthou),
Chetirok
(
(Kefalaria) spread all around, Zhupanishcha and Orman
remained within the ELAS camp. Only one man from
Zhupanishcha volunteered into the 'Ohrana' companies and
IMRO Battalions. SNOF's ranks were swelled by IMRO
bandsmen and Battalionists after the withdrawl of the
German
forces from the Kostour (Kastoria) district in May 1944,
and
particularly after
the defections took place after it was apparent that the
axis
cause was lost.
J_5. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article by Dr Dobrin Michev
in
"Makedonski Pregled" (page 82) Volume XX, 1997, No. 4.
(
16. Much good reading about the major participants can
be
found in: "Uchasta Na B'lgarite v Egeyska Makedonia
1936
1946" by Georgi Daskalov (
F7. By all accounts, Tsvetan Miadenoff is said to have
been
born in the
18^ "Uchasta Na B'lgarite v Egeyska Makedonia 1936
1946"
(page 776) by Georgi Daskalov (
19. "Herakles & The Swastika: Greek Volunteers
in the German
Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (Page 40) by
Antonio J.
Munoz. (
20. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo v
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr Dobrin
Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled" Volume XX, 1997, No. 4. (
1997)
21. For a comprehensive list of leaders and activists,
see:
"Uchasta Na B'lgarite v Egeyska Makedonia 1936
1946"
(chapter six) by Georgi Daskalov (
22. For comprehensive lists of participating villages,
see:
"Uchasta Na B'lgarite....", and "Etsi
Arhise 0 Emphilious 1943
-1945" (
Sta Armata! Istoria Tis Ethnikis Antistasis" (pp
15-16) by
Tomos Defteros (
23. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr Dobrin
Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled" (page 81) Volume XX, 1997, No. 4.
(
24. See: "Egeyski Buri: Revolutsionemoto Dvizhenye
Vo
Vodensko i NOF Vo Egeyska Makedonia" (Page 123)
byV
25. See: "Kratko Istorichesko Biografia Na Rodnoto
Mi Selo
Trsye" (pp 126-129) by Traian Andonoff Giorgioff (
1994).
26. See: "Report on the Free
Florina 1944" by Capt. P.H. Evans, Force 133 FO
371/4349
03880 (Athens Dec. 1st 1944).
27. ibid.
28. A great uncle of the author after being held captive
in
was released and promptly served as an interpreter at
the HQ in
the town ofKostour (Kastoria).
29. ibid.
30. Vlachs are a formerly nomadic pasto
shephards) who speak a Latin based language akin to
modem
Romanian. They can be found in significant numbers all
over
the Balkans, particularly in the Pindus mountain
district of
Kachauni are Grecophone colonists who originate from
who fled to
century to escape the repressive Turkish overlord of
Yanina Ah
Pasha. Kachauni are formerly of Albanian ethnic stock.
The
term "prosfiges" literally means
"refugees" and does not
designate a specific group, but rather a collection of
refugee
groups from diverse places. Most refugees in
south-western
colloquilly known as "Micrasians" and
"Pontians". Also, both
these groups were predominantly Turkophone.
3L See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr Dobrin
Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled"
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
34. See: "Svetii Likovi Od Egeyska Makedonia"
(pp 111-112)
by Tashko Mamurovski (Skopye 1987).
3^. See: "The Inhabited Places of Aegean
55) by Todor Simovski (Skopye 1978)
36. Todor Simovski et al, op cit. (pp 88-89) Also see:
"Bulgartskoto Natsionaino Delo v Yougozapadna
Makedoniya
(1941-1944)" article by Dr Dobrin Michev in
"Makedonski
Pregled" (Page 45) VolumeXXI, No.l. (
quotes the 29th of April for this attack and puts the
number of
those executed at 33. The three day discrepency in the
dates can
be explained simply. The source in the Macedonian
publication
was probably an oral testimony and the Bulgarian source
was
from the High Command office in Kostour. The discrepency
in
the number of victims is a little more difficult to
ascertain. It is
possible the oral testimony "rounded-up" the
figures to 40. The
primary source of the Bulgarian document can be viewed
at:
Central Bulgarian Archives at V
a.e. 820,L. 29.
37. Dakin et al,
op cit (page223) Also, see: "Bulgarian
Conspiracy" (pp 107-108) by J. Swire (
38. See: "Kostourskiot Govor" (pp 19-20) by
Blagoi Shklifov
(
39. Capt. P.H. Evans et al, op cit.
40. Central Bulgarian Archives at V
a.e.792 L.70.
41. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr Dobrin
Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled"
42. ibid.
43. ibid,
44. ibid.
45. ibid.
46. ibid.
47. ibid.
48. ibid.
49. ibid.
50. ibid.
51. S.N.O.F. is an acronym for Slaviano Makedonski
Osloboditelen Front (Slav-Macedonian National Liberation
Front)
52. See: "Herakles & the Swastika: Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (Page 40)
by Antonio
J. Munoz (
53. For lists of participating villages, see:
"Balgartskoto
Natsionaino Delo vo Yugozapadna Makedonia
(1941-1944)"
article written by Dr Dobrin Michev in "Makedonski
Pregled"
54. ibid.
55. See: "Uchasta Na B'lgarite V Egeyska Makedonia
1936
1946" by Georgi Daskalov (
56. See: "Egeyska Makedonia Vo NOB 1941-1945"
(a.e.53)
57. See: "Herakles & the Swastika: Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (Page 35)
by Antonio
Munoz (
58. ibid. (page 41)
59. ibid.
60. ibid.
61. ibid.
62. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr.
Dobrin Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled" (pp 54-55) Volume XXI,
1998, No.l.
63. ibid.
64. ibid.
65. See: "Herakles & the Swastika: Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (Page 40)
by Antonio
Munoz (New York - 1996)
66. ibid. (Page 41)
67. See: "Balgartskoto Natsionaino Delo vo
Yugozapadna
Makedonia (1941-1944)" article written by Dr.
Dobrin Michev
in "Makedonski Pregled" (Page ) Volume XXI,
1998, No. 1.
68. See: "Uchasta Na B'lgarite V Egeyska
Makedonia" by
Georgi Daskalov (
69. ibid.
70. See: "Herakles & the Swastika: Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (Page 24)
by Antonio
Munoz (
71. ibid. (Page 41)
72. See: "Kosturskoto Selo D'mbeni" (pp
122-123) by Lazar
Pop-Yanev (
73. ibid.
74. See: "Herakles & the Swastika: Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS 1943-1945" (pp 35-36)
by Antonio
Munoz (
75. See: "To Hroniko ton Agona - STA ARMATA! STA
ARMATA! - Istorias tis Ethnikis Antistasis" (page
104) by
Tomos Detteros (
on the Free Macedonia Movement....* The ELAS journal
does
not mention the execution of the captives and gives the
total
number captured as 150.
76. See: "Herakles and the Swastika - Greek
Volunteers in the
German Army, Police & SS" (page 41) by Antonio
J Munoz
(
77. ibid.
